The Fade of Democracy in Russia

Unlike the United States, Russia has not fully settled into its role as a democracy. Its government is still very much new, and Putin is only the second leader in its democratic history. Because of this, the decisions made which affect the level of the democracy are the decisions most instrumental in changing the future of the country. If the system of checks and balances, both official and unofficial, are disrupted, the level of democracy in the country may change drastically. Looking at three forms of such checks, the electorate, the media, and the rich elite, it becomes obvious that this is happening.

The gubernatorial electoral reforms in Russia were started as an initiative by Putin after the recent terrorist attack at the school in Belsan. Putin claims the measures are needed by Russia to combat terrorism. Although it is near impossible to judge whether or not this was Putin’s true intention in creating this measure, it is easier to see possible future results. This measure, which eliminated direct election of governors, was coupled with a measure that would dissolve state legislatures if they were to disagree with his choice for a second time. This last part rings familiar when compared to Yeltsin’s decision to dissolve the Duma if they rejected his prime minister nominee for the third time. However, Putin’s measure is far more dangerous to democracy. Yeltsin had inadvertently created a check with that measure, as reelecting a new Duma could put more political dissenters in, but Putin is not in the same situation here. The state legislatures have no power over him, so out of fear of losing their positions, they may very well rubber stamp his governor choices. This will create two problems. First of all, there will be less dissenting political leaders. If the governors owe their positions to Putin, they very well will not voice their opinion when disagreeing with Putin. This erases some of Putin’s accountability to other officials. Secondly, the governors will have no accountability with the electorate. This will cause them to cater more to the needs of the Kremlin, rather than to the specific needs of the people of their regions. Through this change, a system reminiscent of the top-down Soviet government is emerging and Russia is taking a step back from democracy.

Although changes in the media are not as directly tied to the government, they equally affect it. Russia has been taking steps backwards from Gorbachev’s “Media Golden Age” with regard to censorship. Although Yeltsin began this practice in modern Russia, it was never at the proportions at which Putin exercises it. He wields it as a weapon, arresting media political dissenters and closing media outlets under the guise of business reasons. ORT and NTV disappeared, and Novaya Gazeta had its staff replaced by the Kremlin. The results of this so far are disturbing. The media has been self-censoring its coverage of items that may be unfavorable to the Kremlin out of fear. This is dangerous because the Kremlin does not need to have a hand in this anymore, and the trend is likely to continue in the future. Liberalization of ideas is dying, and yet, it is hard to point out because it is not clear to the rest of the world that the media is being forced to do this. Fear is a strong emotion—and that is all the Kremlin needs. Blatantly censoring would immediately remind people of the days of the KBG, but this is far more subtle, and thus, more dangerous. Accountability in the Russian media is near dead.

Another important change is Putin’s approach to the oligarchs. There are many theories surrounding the arrests of many oligarchs, especially that of Mikhail Khodorksky of Yukos. It is difficult to evaluate the fairness in their arrests because it is clear that they have engaged in tax evasions and did not acquire their businesses in the most savory manners, but the Kremlin tended to ignore these practices in many businesses. It seemed that an oligarch was arrested only when he disagreed with the Kremlin. If the arrests of these oligarchs were fair, the Kremlin would be cracking down on all the businesses and not just the political dissenters. As these people are simply rich, elites and have no direct role in government or the people’s view of the government, it raises the question as to why the Kremlin would be bothered by their dissenting. These people are the richest people in Russia, and money does wield some power. If an oligarch disagreed with the Kremlin, the oligarch could bankroll an opposition. The oligarchs, if left alone, might have challenged Putin in the last election, whether through their own candidacy or financial support of another, and Khodorksky probably would have. Despite the financial ability of the oligarchs to do this last election, as well as in the next, the fear of being jailed and taxed is enough to prevent them.

The measures against the media and oligarchs will not let up in the future, even though Putin’s presidency is not at stake anymore. Just as Yeltsin ensured his preferred successor’s election, Putin shall do the same. The fear-control of these bodies takes away the Kremlin’s outside accountability, and the new gubernatorial “reforms” reduce his own accountability as well as increase the accountability of other members of the government to the Kremlin. It appears Putin’s motive in these changes is not to destroy democracy, but to secure his own as well as his party’s success in the government. What he has done, however, is set the democracy of Russia on a downward slope. The danger is if Russia elects an even more authoritarian ruler in the future. All facets of the country have been used to accepting the way the Kremlin is with acquiescence, so it is highly doubtable this will suddenly change if the future president creates even stronger measures. Democracy is slowly fading in Russia—and in its wake, a system with an eerie likeness to that of Soviet Russia is emerging.